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Background: Porcine Epidemic Diarrhea virus (PEDV) is a highly transmissible coronavirus that causes a severe
enteric disease that is particularly deadly for neonatal piglets. Since its introduction to the United States in 2013,
PEDV has spread quickly across the country and has caused significant financial losses to pork producers. With no
fully licensed vaccines currently available in the United States, prevention and control of PEDV disease is heavily
reliant on biosecurity measures. Despite proven, effective biosecurity practices, multiple sites and production stages,
within and across designated production flows in an Ohio swine operation broke with confirmed PEDV in January
2014, leading the producer and attending veterinarian to investigate the route of introduction.
Case presentation: On January 12, 2014, several sows within a production flow were noted with signs of enteric
illness. Within a few days, illness had spread to most of the sows in the facility and was confirmed by RT-PCR to be
PEDV. Within a short time period, confirmed disease was present on multiple sites within and across breeding and
post weaning production flows of the operation and mortality approached 100% in neonatal piglets. After an
epidemiologic investigation, an outsourced, pelleted piglet diet was identified for assessment, and a bioassay,
where naïve piglets were fed the suspected feed pellets, was initiated to test the pellets for infectious PEDV.
Conclusions: The epidemiological investigation provided strong evidence for contaminated feed as the source
of the outbreak. In addition, feed pellets collected from unopened bags at the affected sites tested positive for
PEDV using RT-PCR. However, the bioassay study was not able to show infectivity when feeding the suspected
feed pellets to a small number of naïve piglets. The results highlight the critical need for surveillance of feed
and feed components to further define transmission avenues in an effort to limit the spread of PEDV throughout the
U.S. swine industry.
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Porcine epidemic diarrhea virus (PEDV) is a coronavirus
of the genus Alphacoronavirus. Disease from PEDV is
characterized by vomiting, anorexia, and watery diarrhea
in swine. The virus is particularly deadly for neonatal
pigs for which malabsorption and dehydration [1-3] can
result in mortality rates approaching 80%-100% [2,4].
Disease caused by PEDV is clinically indistinguishable
from transmissible gastroenteritis virus and cannot be
diagnosed on presentation alone [4]. Because attempts at* Correspondence: bowman.214@osu.edu
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unless otherwise stated.virus isolation have only resulted in limited or temporary
success, with virus isolation rates as low as 4% [5], diag-
nosticians heavily rely upon RT-PCR tests to directly de-
tect viral nucleic acid and diagnose PEDV.
PEDV was first identified in Belgium in 1978 and in the
1980s and 1990s, PEDV was found throughout Belgium,
England, Germany, France, the Netherlands, and Switzerland
[6]. Since the European emergence, PEDV has affected the
pork industries in Philippines, South Korea, and China [7].
In May 2013, the United States confirmed the first cases of
PEDV on farms in Iowa and Indiana [2], after which the
virus spread quickly throughout the country. While the
mode of PEDV introduction to the U.S. remains unknown,
comparison of available sequence data indicates the PEDVal. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative
ommons.org/licenses/by/4.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
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to PEDV strains detected in China. At the end of 2013,
sequenced U.S. strains had greater than 99.0% sequence
identity and several strains shared unique nucleotides with
a Chinese PEDV strain isolated in the Anhui Province
(AH2012) [2,3]. Unexpected genetic similarity of U.S.
PEDV strains to a bat coronavirus isolated in southeastern
China may provide evidence for the role of cross-species
transmission in the development of emergent strains that
spread to the United States [3].
Transmission of PEDV occurs via the fecal-oral route
[7] and fecal contamination of fomites may play a role in
the introduction of the virus to swine. An investigation
of 575 livestock trailers at 6 harvest facilities in the
United States showed that all truck drivers stepped into
the harvest facility at least once, and the proportion of
PEDV contaminated trailers increased from 6.6% before
unloading to 9.2% after unloading [8]. These data indi-
cate that contaminated transport vehicles and personnel
could be associated with the rapid spread of the virus
throughout the US. At present, PEDV prevention and
control in the U.S. are heavily dependent on biosecurity
procedures.
While transportation equipment might play a role in
the spread of PEDV, on-farm investigations into several
PEDV outbreaks in the United States have indicated that
contaminated feed could be a pathway of viral introduc-
tion; however, scientific support of this route is regularly
debated. Dee et al. showed that material collected from
the inside of feed bins during a PEDV outbreak was in-
fectious when concentrated and inoculated into pigs [9].
One Canadian report showed spray-dried porcine plasma,
a component used in some swine feed, was infectious to
pigs, but the complete feed containing spray-dried porcine
plasma was not infectious in an experimental setting [10].
On the other hand, a study team has provided contrary
evidence with an unsuccessful attempt to infect pigs with
spray-dried porcine plasma and data that indicates PEDV
is inactivated during spray-dried porcine plasma produc-
tion process [11,12].
In January 2014, an outbreak of PEDV was confirmed
in a multi-site, multiple flow swine operation in Ohio.
After a thorough epidemiologic investigation, contami-
nated feed was identified as the likely source of pathogen
introduction, a finding supported by a positive RT-PCR
result from testing the feed source. Of note, RT-PCR de-
tects viral RNA, and thus can only confirm the presence
of viral nucleic acid in a sample, not necessarily presence
of viable and infectious virus. Since PEDV isolation is
very difficult in numerous testing and research labora-
tories, virus isolation attempts from feed pellets could
not be relied on to detect viable, infectious virus. Conse-
quently, a bioassay was initiated where samples of feed
cryopreserved by the attending veterinarian during theoutbreak were later fed to naïve piglets in an attempt to
demonstrate feed infectivity. This report will discuss the
aforementioned epidemiologic investigation and subse-
quent bioassay findings.
Case presentation
The Ohio swine operation (Figure 1), consisting of 3
multi-site, farrow-to-finish production flows (referred to
as flows A-C, each having two breed-wean sites) and a
multiplier herd (referred to as D, with a single breed-
wean site) had no prior cases of PEDV and was deter-
mined to have effective biosecurity measures in place ev-
idenced by the absence of Porcine Reproductive and
Respiratory Syndrome Virus (PRRSV) during more than
the prior seven years. Routine oral fluid testing of pigs in
flow B on January 8, 2014 and surveillance testing in
flow C in November and December 2013 were all nega-
tive for PEDV. At time of weaning, pigs move from
breed-wean premises to wean-to-finish barns for flow A
and to nursery facilities and then finisher sites for flows
B and C. Weaned pigs from flow D, the multiplier herd,
are raised in gilt developer units or wean-to-finish barns.
Disease outbreak
On the morning of January 12, 2014, four lactating sows
from the one of the breed-wean units in flow A (unit
A1) were noted with vomiting and diarrhea. The illness
spread rapidly and by 4:00 pm, 80 litters showed signs of
diarrhea, vomiting, and dehydration. Within a few days,
80% of sows on the site showed similar clinical signs.
Fecal samples taken January 15, 2014 were positive for
PEDV using RT-PCR. Forty-two percent mortality was
observed in piglets in the A1 farrowing unit. Beyond the
sow unit, a wean-to-finish barn in flow A that received
pigs on January 10th from both flow A breed-wean units
(A1 and A2) reported loose stools on January 12th and
had confirmation of PEDV with RT-PCR positive fecal
samples collected the same day. Also within flow A, one
wean-to-finish barn that was filled with piglets from
both flow A breed-wean units (A1 and A2) on January
10th and 12th had fecal samples test PEDV RT-PCR posi-
tive on January 15, 2014. In addition, on January 15th, a
third wean to finish barn that received pigs from both
flow A sow farms on January 9th had fecal samples test
PEDV positive. A schematic of flow A is shown in
Figure 1A.
While no PEDV-like disease was observed in either
breed-wean units in flow C, pigs in 3 nurseries within
flow C did test PEDV RT-PCR positive between January
14th and January 20th, 2014 (Figure 1C). On January 22,
2014 one breed-wean unit within flow B (B1) began ex-
periencing PEDV-like disease. On that same day, an oral
fluid sample from one of the nurseries in flow B that re-
ceived pigs from both flow B breed-wean units (B1 and
BA
C D
Figure 1 A schematic representation of the pork production system with each of the four production flows represented in separate
panels. Panels A, B, and C illustrate the three separate multi-site, farrow-to-finish production flows within the pork production system which are
referred to as flows A, B, and C respectively. Weaned pigs from flow A are placed into wean-to-finish barns, whereas pigs from flows B and C are
weaned into nursery facilities and later moved to finishing barns. Production flow D, as represented in Panel D, is a multiplier herd with a single
breed-wean site. Weaned pigs from flow D are raised in gilt developer units or wean-to-finish barns. Production sites where porcine epidemic
diarrhea virus (PEDV) was detected during the outbreak are shaded red and the date of PEDV detection is listed.
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PCR positive (Figure 1B). Also on January 22nd, two fin-
ishing barns in flow B had a PEDV PCR positive oral
fluid test. By January 25th, the second breed-wean unit
in flow B (B2) was also experiencing the disease. Overall,
mortality among neonatal piglets was close to 100% in
flow B.
Epidemiological investigation
Five American Association of Swine Veterinarians (AASV)
PEDV questionnaires were completed by a USDA epi-
demiologist and an Ohio Department of Agriculture
Veterinary Medical Officer in conjunction with swine
operation representatives and the operation’s local veterin-
arian. Several potential pathways of pathogen introduction
to the swine operation, including human introduction, de-
livery of contaminated supplies, aerosol spread, contami-
nated pig transport vehicles, and contaminated feed or
feed ingredients were considered and evaluated.
It is unlikely PEDV was introduced to the operation by
visitors or workers. There were no foreign visitors, and no
employees had visited foreign countries within 10 days of
the outbreak. Nor did any employee have swine at their
place of residence or associated farm enterprises. All swineoperation employees and non-employee contractors fol-
low meticulous biosecurity procedures to enter a facility,
and movement of people from one facility to another
within the same day is limited to production managers
only, which typically occur only within the same flow. Ef-
fectiveness of the biosecurity measures in place was evi-
denced by the absence of PRRS cases for over seven years.
Veterinary, vaccine, and semen supplies delivered by
supply vendors were also considered as a potential
source of PEDV introduction to the swine operation, but
were subsequently ruled out as likely sources for several
reasons. First, supplies are delivered to buildings separ-
ate from the swine housing areas and they are not
shared among different flows. Disease, however, broke
out separately in geographically and personnel isolated
units from 3 different flows. In addition, supplies were
disinfected in a fume chamber within the enclosed room
whereby the incoming materials were placed on an elevated
metal grate and a mister system applied a quaternary ammo-
nium/glutaraldehyde combination disinfectant (Synergize,
Preserve International, Reno, NV) and allowed to stand for
15 minutes before entry into site. This practice was consid-
ered to greatly reduce the likelihood of contaminated sup-
plies as the potential route of PEDV introduction.
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as coronaviruses classified within the same group as
PEDV (group 1 coronaviruses) include those that cause
enteric or respiratory infection. Porcine respiratory cor-
onavirus is a mutant of transmissible gastroenteritis
virus and is an example of a group 1 coronavirus that is
spread through droplets and aerosols [14]. Aerosols or
droplets are unlikely to be responsible for the spread of
disease on this swine operation because most units are
not located geographically close to each other, and dis-
ease broke on multiple separate units from 3 separate
flows across a period of 13 days. Additional factors that
could be involved in virus transmission such as water
supply and shavings used during transport of young pigs
are not probable because pigs on all sites have equal ex-
posure to these factors but not all sites were involved in
the outbreak.
Lowe et al. have shown that contaminated transport
vehicles are likely to be involved in rapid spread of
PEDV because it is common to transport pigs to harvest
facilities on vehicles that have not been disinfected be-
tween loads [8]. In relation to the swine operation involved
in this outbreak, it is improbable that contaminated vehi-
cles were involved. First, the operation is closed, meaning
no swine are brought on site unless they are owned by the
entity and managed under the stringent biosecurity proce-
dures displayed by the operation. Second, the operation
maintains 3 truck wash facilities where written protocols
are followed to thoroughly clean, wash and disinfect all
company trucks. The production company regularly audits
the truck wash facilities and was actively testing trucks,
trailers, drying equipment, and wash bays for PEDV; all
samples taken prior to the outbreak and during the first
week of the outbreak were negative for PEDV. Cull animals
are hauled on cull-only trailers controlled by the produc-
tion system and are washed, disinfected, dried and
inspected prior to use. Cull animals are transferred to
a neutral location where the animals are transferred
onto a third party hauler’s washed and disinfected
trailer for market delivery. Finisher trucks are not dis-
infected at company truck washes but rather at truck
washes external to the production system. Given lack
of production system control over these external truck
washes, finishing trucks are perceived as a higher bio-
security risk to the operation; however, trucks trans-
porting finisher swine go only to harvest facilities and
do not come in contact with pigs or sows from breed-
wean units within the operation.
This operation primarily uses feed produced by the
operation’s on-site feed mill, with exception of an out-
sourced starter pellet fed to piglets at the time of wean-
ing and a commercial meal mix used to start nursery
pigs on pellets. It was determined that neither feed sup-
plied by the operation’s own mill, nor the commercialmeal mix were likely to be involved in the transmission
of PEDV to pigs on the operation. Prior to the outbreak,
the same internal feed ingredients and commercial meal
mix had been used with no ill effects. Also, internal feed
ingredients were used across all swine units within the
operation, but not all swine units were involved in the
outbreak.
Because the timing of the outbreak seemed to coincide
with the switch to a new source of starter pellet feed, the
attending veterinarian and farm officials suspected the
new supplier’s starter pelleted diet was the source of
pathogen introduction. Results of the epidemiologic in-
vestigation indicated PEDV genetic material presence in
the starter feed, validating this suspicion.
Starter feed pellets as a source of pathogen introduction
Starter feed pellets from the new supplier were offered
to piglets in the A1 farrowing facility during the week of
January 6, 2014. By January 12, 2014, clinical signs of
PEDV were present among sows and piglets in the A1
facility. Starter feed pellets were subjected to standard
biosecurity procedures to enter into the facility. In short,
feed bags are placed into clean bins from the facility,
and bins loaded with feed are disinfected in a fume
chamber as they are transferred into the facility. Follow-
ing this protocol eliminates contamination from the
outer surface of the bag as the source and indicates feed
ingredients are likely the source of contamination. Sup-
porting the introduced pellets as a likely source, the A2
breed-wean site within the same flow, which never re-
ceived the new supply of feed pellets, remained PEDV
negative. Pigs in one nursery in flow B (BN1), 3 nurser-
ies in flow C (CN5, CN6 and CN7 west barn), and one
wean-to-finish unit in the multiplier herd (D) were also
started on the new supplier’s feed pellets. All of these
sites were subsequently found to be PCR positive for
PEDV except the flow D wean-to-finish unit. It is
thought that differences in pellet storage conditions may
account for this inconsistency from the flow D unit.
Flows B and C store their feed pellets in a room separate
from the barn. During winter, these rooms are estimated
to be at 40°F (approximately 4°C). The units in flow D
store their pellets within the barn where temperatures
are around 80°F (approximately 27°C). Storage in higher
temperatures may have inactivated the virus. This hy-
pothesis is supported in a study by Jung and Chae where
storage of fecal samples at temperatures 21°C and
greater resulted in a decline in PEDV nucleic acid de-
tection by RT-PCR when compared to those stored at
4°C [15].
Another inconsistency was that two contract finisher
facilities in flow B and both B flow breed-wean units also
broke with disease or tested positive for PEDV, even
though these facilities did not receive the new supplier’s
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disease from the units where it broke to the breed-wean
units by human error cannot be ruled out. Of note, the
same person does chores at the B1 farrowing unit and
the BN1 nursery where pigs were fed the implicated pel-
lets. Also, the two flow B finisher facilities had just re-
ceived pigs and do share a person who does chores
between them, but that person did not have direct con-
tact with any of the sow units.
Along with the timing of the outbreak that coincided
with the switch to new supplier’s feed pellets, strong evi-
dence for these feed pellets as the source of the outbreak
comes from PCR testing of the new supplier’s pellets.
Pellets from the BN1 nursery tested PEDV positive by
RT-PCR on January 17, 2014 (Ct value = 32.95). Add-
itionally, three lots of feed pellets from BN2 nursery,
which had been cleaned and disinfected and was empty
of pigs at the time, tested positive for PEDV by RT-PCR
(mean Ct value = 32.58). Pigs that had left this nursery
and were now in a finisher facility tested negative for
PEDV, showing this nursery had been negative for PEDV
while it was housing pigs. Similar findings result from
testing of units within flow C. Feeder pigs that left the
facility at the end of December and beginning of January
were tested and found to be PEDV negative, confirming
that no disease was present prior to January 12. One of
the afflicted flow C nursery sites (CN7) consists of 2
barns labeled east and west. CN7 west barn received
new pigs, pellets from the new supplier, and subse-
quently broke with PEDV. At the same time, the CN7
east barn housed PEDV negative pigs weighing approxi-
mately 50 lbs. from the previous placement. These pigs
stayed PEDV negative after moving offsite all the way
through marketing. Interestingly, CN7 west barn had
pellets from both the old and new suppliers in the barn
at the time of the outbreak. The test results showed
swabs taken on the outside of both old and new sup-
pliers’ pellet feedbags were PEDV RT-PCR positive
(mean Ct value = 31.93). Therefore, pellet samples were
collected with care to avoid contamination from the ex-
terior of the bags. Briefly, the top 25 cm of the feedbags
were wiped with a 0.52% solution of sodium hypochlor-
ite. Bags were then opened by cutting the top of the bag
off with a scalpel to ensure a minimum risk for potential
dust contamination. Feed samples were retrieved from
the center of each bag by the attending veterinarian who
was wearing a sterile obstetrical sleeve. The samples
were placed into a sterile plastic bag, sealed, and submit-
ted for testing. PEDV RT-PCR was positive (mean Ct
value = 33.34) for the new supplier’s pellets and PEDV
RT-PCR negative for the old supplier’s pellets. These re-
sults were interpreted to mean that the exterior of the
feedbags had become contaminated with PEDV in the
barn during the outbreak; however, since PEDV wasdetected in the interior of the unopened bags of the new
supplier’s pellets, PEDV contamination of this feed had
to occur prior to delivery at the barn.
Building on the RT-PCR results from new supplier’s
feed pellets on the swine operation, back-up pellets of
the same lots at the new supplier’s manufacturing facility
also tested RT-PCR positive (mean Ct value = 32.97).
Testing of individual ingredients at the new supplier’s facil-
ity yielded several positive results. Strong evidence impli-
cating pellets from the new supplier as the contamination
source based on the PEDV RT-PCR positive results is
firmly supported by findings of the epidemiologic investi-
gation. The epidemiologic investigation also concluded that
virus isolation from pellets would be critical evidence that
the pellets caused the outbreak.
Bioassay design
Since PEDV is very difficult to isolate, a bioassay was ini-
tiated to determine if the pellets in question could infect
naïve piglets. During the outbreak at the swine operation,
the attending herd veterinarian aseptically collected ali-
quots (as described above) of the RT-PCR positive pelleted
feed from the farm and mixed them with sterile phosphate
buffered saline to make a mash. These moistened, mash
aliquots were stored at −20°C until the bioassay could be
performed.
Ten, 10-day-old pigs, were obtained from a commer-
cial sow herd. Sows from the source herd, the facility
where the bioassay was performed, and the piglets were
all confirmed to be negative for PEDV by RT-PCR at the
start of the bioassay. Serum, collected from the pigs
prior to leaving the source farm, tested negative for
PEDV antibodies using an indirect immunofluorescence
assay. During a 108 hour acclimation period, pigs were
fed a commercial swine starter feed and rectal swabs
from the pigs, feed samples, and environmental swabs
were all collected on a daily basis. Following the accli-
mation period, the pigs were provided ad libitum access
to the RT-PCR positive mash along with dry pellets from
the same lot for 7 days, and observed for clinical signs of
PEDV. Feed samples, environmental swabs, and rectal
swabs were collected each day of the study. After 7 days,
the pigs were euthanized and intestinal tissues were sub-
mitted for diagnostic testing.
Bioassay results
The environment, starter feed, and pigs were PEDV
negative using RT-PCR prior to the study and during the
108 hour acclimation period. Mash aliquots and pelleted
feed obtained from the swine operation site tested
weakly PEDV positive with RT-PCR during the 7 day
study (mean Ct = 36.5). Pigs were observed to be very
healthy during the bioassay and no clinical signs of dis-
ease were observed in the pigs during the bioassay.
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the study were negative for PEDV using RT-PCR. Micro-
scopic examination of intestinal tissues collected from
the piglets at the end of the study revealed no significant
morphologic lesions.
Although the bioassay results did not confirm the feed
pellets in question were infectious, feed cannot be ruled
out as the cause of this outbreak. In the present study,
the sensitivity of the bioassay was limited by the amount
of feed the individual pigs and the small number of pigs
collectively could consume during the trial period. Even
if infectious virus was present in the feed used for the
bioassay, the mean Ct value of 36.5 indicates it would be
present at very low concentration. In addition, the pigs
evaluated appeared healthy, with what was likely limited
disease challenge resulting in little immune or digestive
system compromise. In a field setting where there are
thousands of pigs consuming tons of feed, and known,
observable presence of unthrifty pigs with potentially
compromised digestive or immune systems, it is con-
ceivable that a very small amount of infectious PEDV in
a food source would be capable of initiating an outbreak
that would rapidly spread through the population of sus-
ceptible animals. In addition, the present bioassay por-
tion of the study may have been hindered by the 28 day
lag from the time the feed was manufactured and the
initiation of the bioassay. The time lag likely decreased
the viability of any infectious PEDV that was present in
the feed at the time of delivery to the farm.
Conclusions
Because the timing of this outbreak coincided with a switch
to new out-sourced feed pellets and due to the strong evi-
dence provided by PEDV positive RT-PCR results of these
feed pellets at both the swine operation and the supplier, it
is believed that contaminated feed pellets were the source of
this outbreak. A study reported subsequent to completion of
the present study proved that contaminated feed can serve
as a vehicle to transmit PEDV to naïve pigs [9]. The results
of the epidemiologic investigation, proof of concept by other
investigators and the presence of PEDV RNA from un-
opened bags of feed all support feed as the source of the
outbreak. The inability of a bioassay to prove the feed pellets
were infectious after the outbreak occurred must be consid-
ered, but the low sensitivity of this assay does not rule out
feed as possible source. The results of the present and other
studies demonstrate the need for strict biosecurity practices
and thorough testing for feed and feed ingredients used in
the pork industry for which, PEDV outbreaks can cause dev-
astating financial losses and PEDV surveillance and preven-
tion efforts are of the utmost importance.
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